Sunanary. This paper deals with the saddle-point solutions of a class of stochastic differential games described by linear state dynamics and quadratic objective functionals.The information structure of theproblem is such that both players have access to a common noisy linear measurement of the state and they are permitted to utilize only this information in constructing their controls. The saddle-point solution of such differential game problems have been discussed earlier in Ref.
tical formulation of the problem and discuss inherent limitations of different direct methods that could be used in obtaining its saddle-point solution. In section 3 we include a solution of the deterministic version of the problem, and elucidate the nature and the sources of the error committed in Ref. 1 with regard to the solution of the stochastic game. In order to have a better understanding of the role of information structures in zero-sum stochastic differential games, and of the pitfalls in the derivation of the saddle-point solution, we present in section 4 a scalar 2-stage discrete-time version of the original problem. In particular, we shov that while the deterministic version of this scalar dynamic game admits a pure-strategy saddlepoint solution, its stochastic version admits a saddlepoint in only mixed strategies.
In the next section we provide a precise mathema- The main results of the paper are given in section Specifically, we obtain closed-form expressions for the quadratic stochastic differential game, and prove that saddle-point strategies of the players in the linearthe required conditions of existence do not coincide with, and are in fact more stringent than, the existence conditions of the deterministic version of the I ) On leave from "Applied Mathematics Division, Marmara
Research Institute, Gebze, Kocaeli, Turkey".
problem. The paper ends with a conclusions section where we discuss possible extensions to similarly structured nonzero-sum differential games.
2 . Problem Statement The linear-quadratic zero-sum stochastic differential &ame under consideration in this paper can be defined in precise mathenztical terms as follows:
The evolution of the state (x) of the game is described by the linear Ito stochastic differential equation dxt = A(t)xtdt + B (t)utdt + Be(t)vtdt + F(t)dwt [to, tfl. x is the value of the initial state which is assumed to be Gaussian distributed with mean zero and covariance Po. The functions ut and vt, thto, represent the controls of the pursuer and the evader, respectively, and are vector stochascic.pr_ocesses with continuous sample paths, as to be further explained in the sequel. xt, Eto, is an n-dimensional vector stochastic process with continuous sample paths, and wt, t2to, and w t2to, are statistically independent standard Wiener processes.
2
( 2 )
To delineate the information structure of this game problem, we let Cm = Cm[to,tfl denote the space of continuous functions on [t ,t 1 with values in Rm. We o f further let Yt be the sigma-field in C generated by the cylinder sets {YE Cm, Y EBI where B is a Bore1 set m in R" and t 5 s St. Then, the information gained by each player during the course of the game is completely determined by the information field Y,, t2to. A permissible strategy for the pursuer will be a mapping yp(.,.) of [to,tflX Cm into Rp with the properties: (i) y (t,n) is continuous in t for each rl~C (ii) It is uniformly Lipschitz in n, i.e., Iyp(t,n) -yp(t.E) I 5 k I In -51 1, P t E Ct0,tf) ; n.5 E cm where I I. I I is the standard sup norm in C (iii) ut = y (t,n) is adapted to the information field m'
We denote the class of strategies described above for the pursuer by r Analogously, a permissible strategy ye(.,.) for the evader will be defined as a map- It should be noted that (31 defines the most general quadratic cost function with nonnegative weights on the components of the state and positive weights on the components of the controls of the players. (Actually, X can also be absorbed in the state equation, without any loss of generality, but we prefer to keep it here as a free parameter which we will have occasion to ultilize later.)
The pursuer attemps to minimize J while the evader seeks to maximize the same quantity. Then, a pair of strategies { y Er .p, Y*, Ere} will be in (saddle-point) equilibrium if the pair of inequalities are satisfied for all ypErp, ye~re.
A direct approach of obtaining the solution of this stochastic zero-sum differential game would be first to determine the security strategies of the players and then to investigate conditions under which they constitute a saddle-point equilibrium pair. Recall that a security strategy for a player (say, the pursuer) is defined as a ys Er that satisfies P P But any attempt to obtain the solution of this equality readily fails, since the optimization problem structurally depends on the choice of y and thus one has to solve a different problem for each permissible choice of y cr . One way out of this difficulty would be to restrlct y to a linear class, say Before obtaining the solution of the stochastic game problem as formulated above, let us recall the saddle-point solution ofits deterministic version as far as the information structure is concerned. That is, the players now have access to the current value of the state at each instant of time and they recall past state information throughout the duration of the game. But, the additive Wiener process term in the state equation is still retained in order to insure unicity of equilibria (see Ref. 6 , section 4 , for specific reasons). Then, the saddle-point solution is unique and is given by [Ref. 61 where S ( . ) satisfies the Riccati equation
The condition of existence of the saddle-point solution is precisely the existence of a symmetric matrix solution to (8) which is well-known to admit conjugate points if the time interval is taken sufficiently large However, it is also known that for a fixed time interval [to, t 1, and for fixed game parameters (other than X ) , it is possible to find a Xo>O so that the solution to (8), and hence the saddle-point solution to the game of this section, exist for all O<X<Ao. In particular, a X. that does the job independent of the length of the time interval is that value of X for which B B /X --B B XI, where E is a sufficiently small parameter.
However, this is only a sufficient condition, and it is alwaps possible to find a larger X . that depends on the length of the time interval. 
K(t) -P(t)C'(t)[G(t)G'(t)l-'
It is claimed in Ref. 1 that (9) indeed provides the unique solution to the stochastic differential game problem under consideration, and that it requires the same existence condition as that of the deterministic version treated above (both requiring nonexistence of a conjugate point for the Riccati equation ( 
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4 . An illustrative 2-stage dynamic zero-sum game.
As an illustration of the pitfalls in the derivation of the saddle-point solutions of stochastic dynamic games, let us consider the zero-sum 2-stage stochastic game whose state dynamics are described by the difference equation only to yo, i.e. v = y (y ), whereas the pursuer has access to both yo and y 1 , i.e. u = y (y, yo). Denote their respective strategy spaces by re and r respect ively . c
We thus observe that the stochastic dynamic game under consideration in this section does not admit a does. This does not imply, hovever, that the upper saddle-point even though its deterministic version value of the stochastic game defined by the kernel J(yp, ye) is unbounded, since there exists a welldefined security strategy for the pursuer. (Letting yp(yl, yo) = y l , the reader can easily verify for himself that the upper value is bounded for X<1/4; though this is not the security strategy of the pursuer). The point equilibrium with an appropriate mixed strategy security strategy of the pursuer is in fact in saddleof the evader, which can be written as
where a is a scalar and E is a Gaussian random variable with zero-mean and an appropriate variance. This result can be verified by following an analysis parallel to the one adopted in section 111 of Ref. 8 in solving a particular stochastic game. We will not include details of this analysis here since it is not directly related to the main objective of this paper.
Since one can easily c m e up with examples of the P P I
;: ye) e 0 preceding nature in the continuous-time setting, the message to be transmitted here is that the stochastic mit a saddle-point solution even though its determini- 
stence of a solution, which is more stringent than that
In the next section we reconsider the stochastic 5. Main Results. We now obtain the saddle-point solution of the linear-quadratic stochastic differential game of section 2 , whenever it exists, and also a necessary condition of existence. To this end, let us first consider the hypothetical game in which the players are also endowed with the past values of the control vectors, and denote the corresponding spaces of permissible strategies for the pursuer and the evader by U and Ue, respectively. It should be noted that U 2r and Uelre. Wenow first have Proposition 5.1.
saddle-point pair in the product space U XU P P P The strategies (9-1) and (9-2) constitute a P e' Proof. It is first of all apparent that y given 0 by (9-1) is an element of U (but not of r ), and ye given by (9-2) is an element of Ue (but not of re).
Furthermore, ?it given by (IO) is the conditional mean t t of x given yo, vo and uo. Hence, the error term t xt = xt -iit is independent of the controls of the players, and J can be written solely in the terms of et, t2t0, with some remainder terms depending only on xt, t2t0. This construction makes the problem no different than the deterministic game problem considered at the beginning of section 3 , with ii t replacing xt and the innovation term dy -Cptdt re-
. At -placing the Wiener process increment dut.-Then, the proposition follows from (7-1) and (7-2). The existence condition involved for the saddle-point is clearly identical with the one of the deterministic problem. 0
Letus now assume that the stochastic differential It game admits a saddle-point solution also in the space r xT Then, the following property can be proven.
P e' L e m a 5. 
and with K(.) defined by ( 1 1 ) . We thus observe that the problem of minimizing J (yp, y: ) over U is actually a standard LQG stochastic optimum control problem with state (xt, bt) of dimension 2n. Since the coefficient of the quadratic term in this Zn-dimensional state in the cost function J (yp, yp) is sign-indefinite, the corresponding Riccati equation could admit a conjugate point depending on the length of the time-interval [to, tfl. But we know that this is not the case here, since, by hypothesis, (yp, ye) constitutes a saddle-0 0 point pair. Hence, the kernel J (y p, ye) is strictly convex in y and therefore if we restrict ut only to be a function of the observation yo (i.e., if we restrict y to r ) the solution is clearly unique. This implies that r^ is unique in r In Up, however, the solution of this minimization problem is not unique, since it is possible to write down ditferent "representations" of the same control value in U Nevertheless, the restriction of all these optimal representations to r is unique and is 9
Now, to obtain an expression for ? it is sufficient to note that, since {yp, ye} constitutes a saddle-point solution pair, 7 is in fact the unique restriction of yo to r Thus 7 can readily be obtained by substituting (9-1) and (9-2) into (IO), and solving for the unique ut that depends only on yo, which is (20-1).
0 0 p'
To prove validity of expression (20-2) as the unique saddle-point strategy of the evader, we start with the pair {yp, Ye} considered as a saddle-point,and repeat the preceding argument with some obvi'ous modifications. The result then readily follows. In the following Corollary to Theorem 5.1 we provide a necessary condition which is in fact more stringent than the sufficiency condition of the deterministic problem. with y* and y * given by (20-1) and (20-2), respectively. This characterizes a stochastic control problem for the evader, which is maximization of the cost function J ( y i , ye). This cost function can explicitly be written as starts with the strategies (20-1) -(20-2), and establishes their saddle-point property by solving two stochastic control problems and under the condition of Corollary 5.1. Such a "verification-oriented" approach, however, is not constructive, and besides it does not lead to a complete solution of the problem; that is, the question of whether other pure-strategy saddlepoint solutions exist whenever (20) ceases to be an equilibrium solution remains unanswered. The indirect derivation of this paper, however, answers this question completely; that is the strategy pair (20) provides the only saddle-point equilibrium in pure strategies. 0
Conclusions
For a class of zero-sum stochastic differential games, we used an indirect approach to obtain the saddle-point solution in closed-form, vith the cordimensional system, where n is the dimension of the responding strategies realized as the output of an nstate. The existence conditions involved, however, are more stringent than those of the deterministic version of the problem, and if they are not satisfied then this implies that the stochastic differential game does not admit a saddle-point equilibrium in pure strategies. Though, the discrete-time example solved in section 4 hints that a saddle-point value might still exist, but this time within the class of mixed strategies (for the evader). Derivation of this mixed-strategy saddle-point solution seems, at this point, quite challenging, but Refs. 8 and 12 could provide the reader with considerable insight into this difficult problem.
Yet another class of problems of interest are the stochastic nonzero-sum differential games structured in the same way as the differential game of section 2. But, the method of approach used in this paper cannot be utilized to obtain the Nash equilibrium solutions of such differential games, since Nash solution pairs Lemna 5.2 is not valid in that case). A valid approach do not possess the interchangeability property (i.e. then would be an extension of the one used in Ref.
4, but that would require an a priori assumption (such as linearity) on the structure of the Nash strategies, and even then it is not conceivable that the Nash equilibrium strategies will be finite dimensional. For the discrete-time version of the same problem, however, a special version of the method of Ref. 13 can be utilized to determine the Nash equilibrium solutions (though not in recursive form). In that case, the Nash equilibrium strategies will be unique and linear, whenever they exist.
